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Abstract: This paper discusses how China was represented in the State of 
The Union Address between 1973 and 2020. The hypothesis is that China’s 
image has undergone qualitative changes and that shifting the party in the 
White House is not a sufficient condition to transform this representation. It 
is employed the content analysis to map the frequency of the word ‘China’ 
and to analyze the discursive context of its apparition. The mentions are 
evaluated according to three variables: axiology (positive, negative, or 
mixed), discursive focus (direct or indirect), and frequency of mentions. Four 
discursive paradigms, or periods in which the image was qualitatively stable, 
are identified and discussed. The analysis showed that external shocks have 
an important impact on changing China’s image and that these representations 
usually signalize actual priorities of US foreign policy. 
Keywords: Presidential rhetoric; US policy towards China; Content 
Analysis. 
 
AS IMAGENS DA CHINA NO STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, 
1973-2020 
 
Resumo: Neste artigo, é discutido como a China foi representada nos 
discursos do State of The Union Address entre 1973 e 2020. A hipótese é que 
a imagem da China sofreu mudanças qualitativas e que a troca de partido na 
Casa Branca não é condição suficiente para transformar essa representação. 
O estudo emprega a análise de conteúdo para mapear a frequência da palavra 
‘China’ e analisar o contexto discursivo de sua aparição. As menções são 
avaliadas por meio de três variáveis: axiologia (negativa, positiva ou mista); 
foco discursivo (direto ou indireto) e frequência das menções. Foram 
identificados e discutidos quatro paradigmas discursivos, ou períodos em que 
a imagem foi qualitativamente estável. A análise evidenciou que choques 
externos tem impacto importante na mudança da imagem da China e que as 
representações da China costumam sinalizar prioridades reais da política 
externa dos Estados Unidos. 
Palavras-chaves: Retórica presidencial; Política dos Estados Unidos para a 
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I. Introduction 
 
The State of the Union Address (SOTU) is a constitutional obligation and one of the 
major events in the United States official calendar. There, US Presidents proclaims to Congress 
the national situation and announces proposals for the legislative year (SHOGAN, 2015, p. 1). 
By tradition, the SOTU is delivered at the beginning of Congress’ annual activities, and it has 
been broadcast to the entire country by radio and television since the 1940s (PETERS; 
WOOLLEY, 2019). So, the public was widened through the 20th century, and the speech is now 
thought and addressed to both Congress and the American public (SHOGAN, 2015, p. 15).3 
Because of the high public attention, the SOTU is an extraordinary opportunity for 
Presidents. In this speech, they articulate reasons to achieve support for their political agenda 
or to disseminate novel ideas. According to Shogan (2015, p. 15), the SOTU is “an important 
weapon in the President's arsenal as a legislative leader”. 
Despite its importance, the study of foreign policy in the SOTU is contested due to 
elections every two years. So, when a topic is presented it is not clear whether this is a genuine 
interest or an instrumentalization to achieve a legislative proposal or electoral support. 
However, if the Executive wants to establish new policies or durable ones, it needs support 
from both Congress and public opinion. As Krasner (1977) showed, the political system of the 
United States is weak and domestic opposition can create huge constrains to foreign policy. 
Furthermore, Sutter (2010, p. 100) argued that US foreign policy permeability to domestic 
forces is more outstanding after the Cold War. Hence, social forces dispute the policy 
orientation, and policies that need to extract resources from society or create concentrated costs 
against social groups need to be legitimized to allow the durability of the action course and to 
protect the political capital of the President and his party. In this sense, Kaufmann (2004) 
showed that G.W. Bush, in his intention to achieve public support for preventive war against 
Iraq, used the SOTUs to inflate Iraq’s threat. 
Therefore, this speech is of much interest in foreign policy analysis, above all due to 
constancy allowing historical comparison. Indeed, the presidential guidance can signalize the 
Executive’s actual interests. As Kaufmann (2004) pointed out: “The White House enjoys great 
authority in foreign policy debate”. In this sense, Shogan (2015, p. 11) stated that: “[…] the 
 
3 For Shogan (2015, p. 15): “Presidents must receive the support of a majority in the House, and oftentimes a 
supermajority in the Senate, to enact their legislative proposals. Presidents have realized that the American people 
can help accomplish this frequently difficult task. By appealing directly to the public, a President can use popular 
leverage to convince Congress to adopt his policy agenda.” 
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President can use the State of the Union address more successfully to reshape and reconstitute 
public opinion about foreign policy.” 
This article analyzes the SOTUs from 1973 to present, or from the afterward of Nixon’s 
travel to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) until Trump’s 2020 SOTU.4 The major aim is 
to study the speeches in themselves to identify whether and when qualitatively changes 
occurred. In this sense, some comments regarding the historical context are made for better 
assessment of the speeches, although the long period analyzed does not allow a deep 
presentation of this context.  
The hypothesis is that China’s image has undergone qualitative changes and that shifting 
the party in the White House is not a sufficient condition to transform this representation. It is 
employed the content analysis to map the frequency of the word ‘China’ and to analyze the 
discursive context of its apparition. The mentions are evaluated according to three variables: 
axiology, focus, and frequency of mentions. Axiology evaluation, the main one, is the analyzes 
of the association of China’s mentions to words: positive, negative, or mixed. Next, it is 
observed the discursive focus to identify whether China is the discussion topic. Last, the 
frequency of mentions is counted. The article proposes that the period of analysis could be 
divided into four discourse paradigms or periods in which the image was qualitatively stable.5 
The remainder of the article is organized into six sections. The next five are based in a 
chronological structure. Successively, it is discussed how the President constructed China’s 
image in the periods: 1973 to 1989, 1990 to 1992, 1994 to 2000, 2002 to 2008, and 2009 to 
2020. The concluding section discusses the main findings of the analysis and shows the 
frequency of mentions to China in this period. 
 
II. The promising relationship: the sporadic legitimation of good relations, 1973-1989 
 
The presidency of Richard Nixon (1969-1974) is a turning point for US-China relations. 
Until Nixon, these relations were characterized by mutual hostility and enmities patterns, 
especially after the military clash between the two countries in the Korea War (1950-1953). 
With Vietnam War damage on US leadership and domestic stability, Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger, his National Security Advisor, made a rapprochement movement towards Beijing 
(SUTTER, 2010). After Nixon’s trip, in February 1972, the relationship, with ups and downs, 
 
4 For Peters and Woolley (2019), the initial message to Congress could be used as a SOTU for research purposes, 
even though they are not technically a SOTU. In this article, this message is treated as a SOTU. 
5 The paradigms, as will be shown, are a usual representation, not a monolithic reference. 
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improved culminating with a strategic partnership against the Soviet Union in the 1980s 
(MANN, 2000; FOOT, 1995; COHEN, 2019). 
Analyzing the SOTUs between 1973-1989, the reference to China was only in positive 
terms, despite fewer mentions. Two years after his travel to China, Nixon stated: “With the 
People's Republic of China after a generation of hostile isolation, we have begun a period of 
peaceful exchange and expanding trade.” (NIXON, 1974). In August 1974, Nixon resigned with 
the Watergate scandal, and Gerald Ford becomes the new President. The only mention Ford 
made in the SOTUs regarding China was in 1976. With domestic difficulties in both countries, 
Ford celebrated the relationship and emphasize the grandiosity of China: “We have an 
improving relationship with China, the world's most populous nation.” (FORD, 1976).  
At the end of 1976, the Democrat Jimmy Carter defeated Ford in the presidential 
election. This created the first change of party in the Executive since the rapprochement and 
the expectation of a new China policy due to Carter’s concerns about human rights 
(KISSINGER, 2011). Despite Chinese violation of human rights (MANN, 2000), he does not 
criticize China in the SOTUs, and the positive discourse remained. In 1979, the US recognize 
PRC as the government of China and denounced the defense treaty with Taipei. This year, 
Carter cited hope and grandiosity when he referred to China in the SOTU: “We are entering a 
hopeful era in our relations with one-fourth of the world's people who live in China.” 
(CARTER, 1979). In 1980, he argues that: “Our decision to normalize relations with the 
People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the Western 
Pacific.” (CARTER, 1980). 
Ronald Reagan, a passionate anti-communist, won the 1980 election against Carter, 
creating new expectations of conflicts against PRC (MANN, 2000). In the election, Reagan 
criticized Carter’s policy towards Taiwan, arguing that the US has abandoned the island with 
the terminus of the defense treaty (SUTTER, 2010, KISSINGER, 2011). Despite some frictions, 
associated mainly with US sales of weapons to Taipei, the US and China increased defense 
cooperation and merged a strategic partnership against the Soviet Union (YUAN, 1995, 
MANN, 2000, FOOT, 1995). In this context, the Reaganian crusade against communism 
silenced about China and it is mentioned only once in Reagan’s SOTUs, a positive note in 1985: 
“Many countries in east Asia and the Pacific have few resources other than the enterprise of 
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their own people. But through low tax rates and free markets they've soared ahead of centralized 
economies. And now China is opening up its economy to meet its needs.” (REAGAN, 1985).6 
In 1988, George H. Bush, Reagan’s vice-president, was elected President of the United 
States. In the elections, Bush proposed the continuity of China policy and, in power, realized 
the softest transition of power in China policy since the Nixon rapprochement (MANN, 2000; 
SUTTER, 2010). In this vein, the first Adress to Congress on February 9, 1989, the words about 
China are about the impressiveness of changes: “When I served as our representative in China 
14 or 15 years ago, few would have predicted the scope of the changes we've witnessed since 
then.” (BUSH, 1989). Notwithstanding, that was the only mention of China in Bush’s SOTUs. 
Few months after the speech occurred Tiananmen repression and the Cold War started to 
crumble. 
In sum, the data of the period from 1973 until 1989 shows that China was represented 
only with positive terms, like ‘opening’, ‘peace’, ‘grandiosity’, or ‘stability’. Throughout these 
years, no one president associated China with communism or highlight human rights concerns 
in the SOTUs. The strategic partnership identified by literature (See MANN, 2000, FOOT, 
1995, MEIJER, 2015) was translated in the SOTUs with praise references. Also, when China 
was mentioned the discussion was usually direct, and the frequency of mentions was low, only 
nine mentions in sixteen years. 
 
III. The silence of Janus: Bush in the shadow of Tiananmen, 1990-1992 
 
The year 1989 is very important for the relationship between the US and China (MANN, 
2000; DUMBAUGH, 2000). The Tiananmen repression in June of this year broke down 
China’s international image, erasing the previous idea that it was liberalizing and becoming a 
“normal country”. Many leaders started to see China as a repressive state. In this sense, James 
Mann (1999) argued that Tiananmen was a turning point for the American public and it changed 
China’s image from “going capitalist” to “repressive China”.7 
President Bush established sanctions against China for Tiananmen repression but 
protected China’s “Most-Favored-Nation” (MFN) status. Few weeks after the episode, he 
 
6 The words of Reagan’s administration are even more positive in the National Security Strategy of 1987, and they 
affirmed that the US appreciates the diversity of the regimes (WHITE HOUSE, 1987). 
7 Mann (1999, p. 102) identified that: “[…] stories in the American media tend to be governed at any given time 
by a single story, image or concept. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the “frame” was of China as little blue ants or 
automatons. In the 1970s, following the Nixon administration’s opening, the frame was of the virtuous 
(entertaining, cute) Chinese, displaying their timeless qualities even under communism. In the 1980s, the frame 
was that China was ‘going capitalist.’ And for most of the 1990s, the frame was of a repressive China.” 
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decided that the US cannot alienate China and send a secret high-level mission to China, two 
times, to negotiate with the Chinese leadership. With Cold War unconcluded, the President 
feared the alienation of China would benefit the Soviet Union. But Congress, with both houses 
controlled by Democrats, discovers the trips and the pressure against Bush China’s policy 
skyrocketed (SUTTER, 2010, MANN, 2000).8  
As a target for critics and with indecision about what should be US policy for China 
after that critical juncture, the President silenced about China in the remaining SOTUs. 
Probably, the President was waiting to see whether a new paradigm was needed or if it was 
necessary to sustain the old one. As a Janus government between two ages, the choice was to 
wait and silence. 
 
IV. Clinton’s bridge: undermining repression with normal relations, 1994-2000 
  
The election of Democrat William Clinton associated with the Cold War utter 
conclusion generated a new pattern. A few after arriving in the White House, Clinton started a 
fresh discursive approach towards China. He renewed the MFN in 1993 but created a condition 
for the next renewals: the improvement of human rights in China.9 However, after China knew 
that the administration was divided on the issue, the Chinese government chose to see if 
Clinton’s words were genuine. With enormous pressure from the business community, Clinton 
abandoned the condition in 1994 and renew the MFN despite few changes in Chinese behavior 
regarding human rights. (MANN, 2000) 
After this friction, Clinton usually represented China as a repressive country, but one 
that could be freer if the United States maintained normal relations, above all in trade and 
diplomatic terms. The defense of what is called “engagement policy” was the basis of China’s 
image in the SOTUs of Clinton years. After the failure, Clinton portrayed China as a repressive 
country that should not be isolated, because the best prospect for freedom in China was to 
integrate Beijing in the liberal order. Therefore, China was presented in a new frame, being at 
the same time highlight the dark side of China and the potentiality for good. In 1994, he made 
the only mention to China in his first mandate. Clinton stated the importance of good relations 
with China and argued that PRC should change his human rights policies: “And as we build a 
more constructive relationship with China, we must continue to insist on clear signs of 
improvement in that nation's human rights record.” (CLINTON, 1994).  
 
8 In the elections of 1992, William Clinton accused Bush’s administration of “protect tyrants”. 
9 The condition was a plea made by Clinton in the presidential campaign. 
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In the second mandate, Clinton frequently mentioned China in the SOTUs. The 
domestic context was tougher after the Third Taiwan Crisis in 1996, and Republicans and 
Neoconservatives were pressuring for hard measures against China. Also, it remained the 
pressure from human rights groups and syndicates to cut MFN status to China. In this context, 
Clinton supported business interest and stated in 1997 SOTU that: “We must pursue a deeper 
dialog with China for the sake of our interests and our ideals. An isolated China is not good for 
America; a China playing its proper role in the world is.” (CLINTON, 1997) In the same speech 
he concludes: “[…] engaging China is the best way to work on our common challenges like 
ending nuclear testing and to deal frankly with our fundamental differences like human rights 
(Ibid). 
This speech is symbolic. It was announced one year after the military tensions between 
the US and China in Taiwan Strait. Against powerful groups, Clinton legitimated normal 
relations with China, therefore realizing the opposite movement that G.W. Bush made in the 
2000s against Iraq.10 Despite China’s missile diplomacy, Clinton made a “threat deflation” to 
sustain the MFN and diplomatic relations with Beijing. For the disgust of Republicans, Clinton 
does not create China as a threat to the domestic public. 
In 1999 and 2000, when Clinton was a lame-duck president, the mentions rise in the 
context of the US-China negotiation for the Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In 1999, the president supported normal trade relations with China, taking a position 
in a hard debate in US society.11 Clinton stated that for the advance of human rights in China it 
was important a normal relationship with Beijing. In 1999 SOTU, Clinton criticized China’s 
behavior: “In China, last year, I said to the leaders and the people what I'd like to say again 
tonight: Stability can no longer be bought at the expense of liberty.” (CLINTON, 1999) 
Nevertheless, he continued: “But I'd also like to say again to the American people: It's important 
not to isolate China. The more we bring China into the world, the more the world will bring 
change and freedom to China.” (Ibid.). In the last year, Clinton restated the defense of the 
institute of permanent normal trade relations with China, a bill which erased the annual debate 
about renewing MFN to China. 
 
10 For Kaufmann (2004), G.W. Bush made a “threat inflation” to legitimize the 2003 Iraq war. 
11 In the 1990s, there was no domestic consensus about the extension of MFN to China. In the political right, 
religious organizations and conservatives’ republicans joining hands with, in the political left, progressive 
democrats, syndicalists, and human rights groups, to criticize MFN extension. On the other side, centrists, business 
leaders, and free traders supported the extension (See DUMBAUGH, 2000). Clinton’s intervention, therefore, was 
necessary, and House of Representatives passed PNTR with the voting of 237 in favor and 197 votes against the 
bill. The Republican party was the one that most supported the PNTR. Voting data available at 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll228.xml , access: 09/16/2019. 
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 […] I believe Congress should support the agreement we negotiated to bring China 
into the WTO, by passing permanent normal trade relations with China as soon as 
possible this year. […] Our markets are already open to China; this agreement will 
open China's markets to us. And second, it will plainly advance the cause of peace in 
Asia and promote the cause of change in China. No, we don't know where it’s going. 
All we can do is decide what we're going to do. But when all is said and done, we 
need to know we did everything we possibly could to maximize the chance that China 
will choose the right future. (CLINTON, 2000). 
 
In Clinton’s speeches, therefore, China could be open and free, and the maintenance of 
normal relations probably will support freedom. He stated that normal trade relations are not an 
end, but a device to freedom and democracy, an argument near to Francis Fukuyama’s end of 
history thesis about the inevitability of liberal democracy. The President does not silence over 
the negative side of the Chinese regime but maintained the need for good relations due to 
business interest in the Chinese market. Like George H. Bush, Clinton opposed the isolation of 
China and used his political capital in defense of normal relations. Therefore, China’s image 
was more mixed in Clinton’s administration. He highlighted both the human rights problems 
and the potential for good relations and freedom. Last, China was usually discussed direct and 
the frequency of mentions was high, twenty-two times in six years. 
 
V. The Sino-American quiet cooperation, 2002-2008 
 
The election of George W. Bush in 2000 empowered a group with a more negative view 
regarding China. In the campaign, G.W. Bush supported Chinese entry into the WTO but stated 
that China was not a strategic partnership of the United States, as suggested by Bill Clinton in 
1998. (SUTTER, 2010; PECEQUILO, 2011) For the Republican candidate, China was not an 
enemy, but neither a partner: “China is a competitor, to be faced without ill will and without 
illusions.” (BUSH, 2000). In the first months of the new administration, US-China relations 
were hardening with a diplomatic crisis regarding the Hainan Island incident and arms sales to 
Taiwan. (PECEQUILO, 2011) Nevertheless, the 11th of September changed the strategic focus 
of the United States (MASTANDUNO, 2009; KISSINGER, 2011) and the White House started 
to see and represent China as a partner in the Global War against Terror or in dealing with the 
North Korea nuclear program.12 Terrorism was constructed as the main threat to the United 
 
12 For some, the strategic reorientation away from China involved a decade, for others, it was a question of two or 
three years. (See ROCHA, 2020, p. 254-259). 
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States (See LEITE, 2013) and dominated Bush’s SOTUs, marginalizing other topics like China. 
As shown the Figure 1, China does not have centrality in Bush’s SOTUs. 
 
Figure 1. Frequency of the terms “China” and “Terrorism/Terrorist” in the SOTU, 1989-2019 
   
Source: data from SOTUs. Authors’ elaboration. 
 
China was mentioned five times in the SOTUs of G.W. Bush’s years. Few months after 
the terrorist attack, he stated: “In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old 
rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, 
to achieve peace and prosperity.” (BUSH, 2002). In 2003, the President affirmed: “America is 
working with the countries of the region -- South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia -- to find a 
peaceful solution and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will bring 
only isolation […].” (BUSH, 2003 In 2006, he made the only negative association when 
associated economic competition with China and India, arguing that this challenge cannot be 
addressed by protectionist measures, that are poor policies. 13 Next year, G.W. Bush returned 
to the pattern and pointed out: “Together with our partners in China, Japan, Russia, and South 
Korea, we're pursuing intensive diplomacy to achieve a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear 
weapons.” (BUSH, 2007). Finally, in 2008, the president supported the creation of a clean 
energy fund to help developing countries like India and China. Therefore, G.W. Bush made few 
comments about China and usually associates it with cooperation against the North Korea 
nuclear program. 
Hence, despite G.W. Bush’s electoral campaign, China is not represented in the SOTUs 
as a threat. It usually appeared as a partner to deal with North Korea’s nuclear program – in the 
 
13 In 2006, G.W. Bush associated China with economic competition: “The American economy is preeminent, but 
we cannot afford to be complacent. In a dynamic world economy, we are seeing new competitors, like China and 
India, and this creates uncertainty, which makes it easier to feed people's fears. So we're seeing some old 
temptations return. Protectionists want to escape competition, pretending that we can keep our high standard of 
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context of the “six-party talks” – and is once represented as a developing nation that needs help. 
So, China was mentioned a few times, and she was usually associated with positive words. 
Usually, the President represented China in positive terms, associated with cooperation. The 
image was more benign than in Clinton's age because Bush does not highlight human rights 
concerns. The discussion is indirectly, and the frequency of mentions was low, five mentions 
in six years. 
 
VI. A competitor threatening America, 2009-2020 
 
Amidst the financial crisis that was crumbling the world economy, Barack Obama was 
elected the president of the United States in 2008. In Obama’s age, China’s imaged suffered the 
most dramatic transformation in the SOTU representation since the rapprochement. It was 
usually represented as an economic competitor that threatens the US economy, associated many 
times with unfair competition.14 As Mastanduno (2014) argued, the financial crisis generated 
grievous concerns about China’s rise in the United States.  
In the first “Address to Congress” of 2009, Obama argued that the country that better 
develop clean and renewable energy will lead the world in the 21st century, mentioning that 
China launched the biggest effort in history to energy efficiency. In the SOTU 2010, Obama 
stated that the US has always competed and that he will invest in infrastructure, adding that 
there is no reason for China and Europe to have better trains or manufacturing installation to 
clean energy products. Obama stated that the United States cannot be in second place:  
China is not waiting to revamp its economy. Germany is not waiting. India is not 
waiting. These nations — they're not standing still. These nations aren't playing for 
second place. They're putting more emphasis on math and science. They're rebuilding 
their infrastructure. They're making serious investments in clean energy because they 
want those jobs. Well, I do not accept second place for the United States of America. 
(OBAMA, 2010) 
 
In 2011, China was represented as an economic competitor, and Obama argued that 
China and India were investing in technological education and that the US was lagging. 
However, there is a positive note stating the deal between the US and China and the US and 
India, that will promote thousands of jobs in the United States.  
Next year was an electoral one. The Republican campaign of Mitt Romney used China 
as a device to attack Obama’s policies for the US economy. This campaign was the one that 
 
14 This idea was not restricted to SOTU, the President made similar representations in other speeches 
(YANG, 2016) and also criticized the terms of Chinese entry into the WTO in government meetings 
(MANN, 2012). 
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China was most criticized and commented on the presidential debates since the end of the Cold 
War (ROCHA, 2020). Then, Obama’s rhetoric was tougher and he mentioned that his 
administration has made more cases against China in WTO: “We've brought trade cases against 
China at nearly twice the rate as the last administration -- and it's made a difference.” (OBAMA, 
2012). The President states that China does not respect Intellectual Property Rights and that he 
will create a “Trade Enforcement Unit” to investigate unfair trade practices, like the Chinese. 
Also, he states: “I will go anywhere in the world to open new markets for American products. 
And I will not stand by when our competitors don't play by the rules. We've brought trade cases 
against China at nearly twice the rate as the last administration -- and it's made a difference.” 
(OBAMA, 2012) 
 In 2013, the President mentioned that China was heaving investing in clean energy and 
that the US cannot lag: “Solar energy gets cheaper by the year — let's drive down costs even 
further. As long as countries like China keep going all in on clean energy, so must we.” 
(OBAMA, 2013). In 2014, in the fight for Trade Promotion Authority, Obama mentioned that 
it is the US, not China, the better place to make commercial deals. Also, he says that it is 
necessary for products made in the US to compete in the global market: “We need to work 
together on tools like bipartisan trade promotion authority to protect our workers, protect our 
environment, and open new markets to new goods stamped ‘Made in the USA.’  China and 
Europe aren’t standing on the sidelines.  Neither should we.” (OBAMA, 2014).  
The next year, the rhetoric against China was tougher, stating that Beijing was not just 
an economic competitor, it was trying to be a rule-maker in the trade field.15 For Obama, the 
United States cannot allow China to write these rules:  
Today, our businesses export more than ever, and exporters tend to pay their workers 
higher wages.  But as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-
growing region.  That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage.  
Why would we let that happen?  We should write those rules.  We should level the 
playing field.  That’s why I’m asking both parties to give me trade promotion authority 
to protect American workers, with strong new trade deals from Asia to Europe that 
aren’t just free, but are also fair. (OBAMA, 2015) 
 
In the last SOTU, 2016, Obama tried to approve the Transpacific Partnership (TPP). In 
this context, he affirms that TPP is a device to China does not write trade rules in Asia and to 
preserves the US’ hegemony: “With TPP, China does not set the rules in that region; we do. 
You want to show our strength in this new century? Approve this agreement. Give us the tools 
 
15 In 2015, the President mentioned the climatic deal between the US and China. In this speech, he also made an 
indirect reference to China: “In the Asia Pacific, we are modernizing alliances while making sure that other nations 
play by the rules -- in how they trade, how they resolve maritime disputes, how they participate in meeting common 
international challenges like.” (OBAMA, 2015) 
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to enforce it. It's the right thing to do.” (OBAMA, 2016). Therefore, in the last two years, China 
is not an economic competitor, but a normative competitor that could threaten US hegemony in 
the 21st century.16 
Elected in November 2016, Donald Trump made a campaign attacking China for 
stealing jobs from the United States and even stated that China was an enemy of the United 
States. In the SOTU, the negative pattern initiated by Obama is maintained. In the first Address 
to Congress, Trump mentions that China’s entry in WTO harmed the US economy: “We’ve lost 
more than one-fourth of our manufacturing jobs since NAFTA was approved, we’ve lost 60,000 
factories since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.” (TRUMP, 2017) 
In 2018, Trump reiterate the ideas announced in the National Security Strategy of 2017. 
He classified China, with Russia, as rivals to United States interests and values. This was the 
first time since the rapprochement that China was represented explicitly as a strategic adversary 
in the SOTU.17 After, Trump repeated Reagan’s idea that the best defense is to be an unrivaled 
power and sought an increase of defense spending. 
Around the world, we face rogue regimes, terrorist groups, and rivals like China and 
Russia that challenge our interests, our economy, and our values. In confronting these 
dangers, we know that weakness is the surest path to conflict, and unmatched power 
is the surest means of our defense. For this reason, I am asking the Congress to end 
the dangerous defense sequester and fully fund our great military (TRUMP, 2018). 
 
 In 2019, Trump supported his trade policies that generated a trade war between the US 
and China. The President argued that China targeted US companies and steal intellectual 
property harming the US economy. The trade war, therefore, was a necessity and he puts tariffs 
in the value of 250 billion dollars against Chinese products.18 In the same speech, he stated that 
the United States was withdrawn from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, but a new deal is 
possible if China and others are added. In 2020 SOTU, Trump restated the “China’s massive 
theft of American jobs” and that “for decades China has taken advantage of United States” 
 
16 Obama usually represented China in three patterns: as a benchmarking allowing the President to support his 
policies; as an unfair competitor that harms the US economy and workers; and as a normative competitor that 
seeks to undermine US power position, especially in economic terms. 
17 Obama associated China with the geopolitical competition in other speeches, like the electoral debate with John 
McCain on September 26, 2008, or the Farewell address: “Rivals like Russia or China cannot match our influence 
around the world, unless we give up what we stand for and turn ourselves into just another big country that bullies 
smaller neighbors.” (OBAMA, 2017). 
18 “We are now making it clear to China that, after years of targeting our industries and stealing our intellectual 
property, the theft of American jobs and wealth has come to an end. Therefore, we recently imposed tariffs on 
$250 billion of Chinese goods, and now our Treasury is receiving billions and billions of dollars. But I don’t blame 
China for taking advantage of us; I blame our leaders and representatives for allowing this travesty to happen. I 
have great respect for President Xi, and we are now working on a new trade deal with China. But it must include 
real, structural change to end unfair trade practices, reduce our chronic trade deficit, and protect American jobs.” 
(TRUMP, 2019) 
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(TRUMP. 2020). But he said that “we have perhaps the best relationship we’ve ever had with 
China” (Ibid) and states the Sino-American cooperation against Coronavirus: “We are 
coordinating with the Chinese government and working closely together on the coronavirus 
outbreak in China.” (Ibid). 
Therefore, China was cited eleven times in the first mandate of Obama. It was associated 
with economic competition ten times. In the second mandate, China was cited nine times, been 
associated with broad economic competition eight times, where two of these associations were 
tougher and the President suggested that China was an economic-normative competition. In the 
first mandate of Trump, China was mentioned thirteen times, in eight times it was related to 
competition, six times the association was with economic competition and two times with the 
strategic competition. Hence, the major reference is to contemporary competition, the focus 
was direct, and the frequency of citation is high, 33 times in 11 years. There was a qualitative 
change concerning the three previous paradigms, and China, cited every year, was usually 
represented in negative terms. Despite the negative image, it cannot be argued that they were 
constructing China as an enemy in the SOTUs because the number of mentions is fewer 
compared to other threats constructions, like G.W. Bush’s speeches against Iraq. The reference 
is softer, and China is represented as an adversary. Both Obama and Trump represented China 
as a competitor that must be controlled or surpassed, a threat sometimes to the US economy 
and other to the US hegemony. In this aspect, the Trump election does not create a substantial 
change, on the contrary, it intensifies the previous logic, inserting a more hostile and hyperbolic 




In the years analyzed, there were qualitative changes in China’s representation in the 
SOTU and four paradigms could be identified. The first, 1973-1989, China is mentioned 
sporadically and is not associated with negative elements for American society, like 
communism or human rights problems. China is usually praised and represented with positive 
words, like peace, grandiosity, stability, or economic freedom. This pattern disappeared after 
June 1989. With the crumbling of the Cold War and domestic pressure against his China’s 
policy, Bush silenced and not mentioned China in the last three SOTUs. 
The end of the Cold War and Clinton’s election allowed the rise of a new discursive 
paradigm. In 1994-2000, China is mentioned more frequently and is associated with a negative 
present due to human rights behavior, but a positive future could be achieved if the US 
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maintained normal relations with Beijing. In this period, the mentions are more frequent, 
especially in the tough debate about China’s entry into the WTO. In these years, China is 
represented as a repressive state that could be free if the US maintained normal relations, 
especially in trade. 
The election of G. W. Bush and the 11th September terrorist attack created a new pattern. 
In the third paradigm, between 2002-2008, China’s mentions are sporadically and usually 
associated with a positive present due to Sino-American cooperation against the North Korean 
nuclear program. 
The financial crisis of 2008 and Barack Obama’s election made another qualitatively 
change. At the fourth paradigm, 2009-2020, China was mentioned with greater frequency and 
was associated with a negative present. It was generally characterized as an unfair economic 
competitor. With Trump’s administration, the pattern of contemporary threat was widened. 
Also, China started to be represented as a strategic adversary and the words regarding this 
country were sharper. Due to the duration and the resistance to the change of party in the White 
House, this paradigm appears to have strong rootedness. 
 
Table 1. China’s images in the State of The Union Address, 1973-2020. 
Paradigm Basic Axiology Focus Frequency (mentions/years) 
1973-1989 Positive Direct Low (0,5) 
1994-2000 Mixed Direct High (3,6) 
2002-2008 Positive Indirect Low (0,8) 
2009-2020 Negative Direct High (2,8) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Therefore, China’s image undergone important changes and was not constructed 
idiosyncratically by each government. In the first and fourth paradigms, the image was not 
modified after the victory of the opposition in presidential elections. Even the third paradigm 
can be indicated as more than a Clinton one because the argument was introduced by George 
Bush in the context of Tiananmen (See MANN, 2000). Hence, in the period of analysis, there 
were nine presidents, six changes of parties in the White House, and fourth patterns of China’s 
images. This suggests that the change was more related to external shocks – like the end of the 
Cold War, the 11th September attack, or the 2008 financial crisis – than to electoral results. 
The analysis also highlighted the correlation between US foreign policy towards China 
and the domestic representation of this country. Though the signalizing is not necessarily 
transparent, the presidential words are not cheap talk (KAUFMANN, 2004; ROCHA, 2020). 
The Clinton support of China’s entry into the WTO and the Bush initiative of Six-Party talks 
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were announced in the SOTU. Also, at the same time that Obama represented China as a 
competitor, the US policy towards China was much more aggressive in trade terms, even though 
Obama’s method involved plurilateral and multilateral actions rather than Trump’s preference 
for unilateralism. The SOTU is, therefore, an important channel to access aspects of US foreign 
policy towards China, and changes in the speech suggest new policy directions. 
 
Figure 2. Paradigms and frequency of mentions to “China” in SOTU, 1973-2020 
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